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WORK ASSIGNMENT RESOLUTIONS: SECTION
10(k) "FINALITY" AND EMPLOYERS' ABILITY
TO SECURE JUDICIAL REVIEW
Mack Allen Player*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The issue of whether an employer can secure judicial review of
work assignment awards made by the National Labor Relations Board
pursuant to section 10(k) of the National Labor Relations Act' has
never been fully resolved. Two recent decisions have made the need
to define the employer's right to judicial review more critical. In International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. Local 134, IBEW,2 the
United States Supreme Court held that a section 10(k) determination
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. A.B., Drury
College; J.D., University of Missouri; LL.M., George Washington University.
1. Section 10(k), 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1970), provides:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor
practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(D) of section 158(b) of this
title, the Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute
out of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless, within ten
days after notice that such charge has been filed, the parties to such dispute
submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed
upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance
by the parties to the dispute with the decision of the Board or upon such
voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be dismissed.
Section 8(b)(4)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1970), defines an unfair labor
practice as
forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees
in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or
class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another
trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order
or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work ....
2. 419 U.S. 428 (1975). In this case the losing union had appealed to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals to have the § 8(b)(4)(D) cease and desist order set aside.
The court of appeals refused to enforce the order, ruling that the Board had not complied with § 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970), because
the § 10(k) hearing officer had participated in both the § 10(k) and § 8(b)(4)(D)
proceedings. 419 U.S. at 606-07. See notes 18-25 infra and accompanying text. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that § 5 of the APA does not govern proceedings conducted under § 10 of the National Labor Relations Act. 419 U.S. at 443-44. The Court
reasoned that a § 10(k) determination is not a final order within the meaning of § 2(d)
of the APA because although practical consequences might flow from a § 10(k) proceeding, the Board did not order any party to do anything at the proceeding's conclusion.
Id. at 444-46.
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was not an "order" or "final disposition" subject to court of appeals4
review.3 The Ninth Circuit, in NLRB v. Longshoremen's Local 50,
ordered the Board to formulate and articulate relevant criteria to be
used in making section 10(k) awards. The court also indicated that
the judiciary would no longer blindly defer to the Board's determinations. 5 The vast majority of prior Board decisions upheld the employer's
preference, usually without articulating their emphasis on this factor.6
Thus while the International Telephone & Telegraph decision seems
to preclude the right to judicial review, the Ninth Circuit decision may
make it imperative that employers secure this right. Although the statute itself and the legislative history are silent, the conventional wisdom
has been that the employer could not secure review either of section
10(k) awards themselves or of decisions by the Board not to make
awards. 7 Conventional wisdom should be reexamined in light of practical realities.
II.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE SECTION
ASSIGNMENT

A.

10 (k)

WORK

AwARD

The Employer as a "PersonAggrieved" by a
Work Assignment Award
To secure court of appeals review an employer must establish that

3. 419 U.S. at 443-44.
4. 504 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1974). This case involved a longstanding dispute between longshoremen and operating engineers over which union had the right to operate
barge-mounted floating whirly cranes. See Henderson v. Longshoremen's Local 50, 457
F.2d 572 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 852 (1972); Henderson v. Operating Engineers Local 701, 420 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1969). In this latest litigation, the Board
determined that the Engineers were entitled to the work. 504 F.2d at 1212. The Longshoremen's Union failed to notify the Board of its intent to comply with the determination, and therefore a § 8(b)(4)(D) unfair labor practice complaint was issued
against them. Id. The appellate court reversed on the grounds that it was "unable to
conclude . . . that the Board's work assignment to the Engineers [was] not arbitrary
and capricious." Id. at 1222.
5. 504 F.2d at 1220-22. The court stated that the Board's failure to announce the
standards and principles on which cases were decided made "judicial review virtually impossible, because the decision[s] [were] totally unprincipled." Id. at 1220. The court
pointed out that while "[t]he courts could be expected to give greater deference to Board
decisions during the period in which the Board's decisionmaking process was developing
" this
....
practice should no longer be followed because neither "Congress [n]or the
.
Supreme Court intended that judicial review should be such a paper tiger." Id.
6. See id. at 1221; Player, Work Assignment Disputes Under Section 10(k): Putting the Substantive Cart Before the ProceduralHorse, 52 TEXAs L. REV. 417, 444-46
(1974).
7. See Shell Chem. Co. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
95 S.Ct. 1951 (1975); Henderson v. Longshoremen's Local 50, 457 F.2d 572 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 852 (1972); 3 J. JEKINs, LABOR LAw § 18.10 (1974).
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he is a "person aggrieved by a final order of the Board."' One good,
but theoretical, reason for denial of section 10(k) review is that the

employer is not legally a "person aggrieved" by the award. The ostensible purpose of section 10(k) is to protect "the neutral employer from
loss due to conflicting demands by competing unions that the employer
It could be asserted that the employer has
is powerless to satisfy."'
no cognizable interest in which competing union secures the award, but
only that an award be made, so he need deal with but a single employee representative. If the employer has economic reasons for not
wishing to award the work to the winning union, this may be viewed
as an economic dispute between the employer and the union, for which
section 10(k) resolution was not designed. Since the employer has
no legal interest in the merits of the dispute between the unions, he
could not be "aggrieved" by any award. 10
Despite the logic of this argument, the Board and the Supreme
Court have categorically rejected the notion that the employer is an unconcerned neutral. In NLRB v. Plasterers'Local 79,"1 the Court recently emphasized the substantial economic interest of the employer
in the outcome of work assignment disputes. 12 Given this recognition
8. Section 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970), provides in pertinent part:
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in
whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any
United States court of appeals . . . by filing in such a court a written petition
praying that the order of the Board be modified or set aside . . . . ITihe
court shall proceed in the same manner as in the case of an application by the
Board under subsection (e) of this section ....
9. Henderson v. Longshoremen's Local 50, 457 F.2d 572, 577 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 852 (1972) (citations omitted).
10. See Plasterers' Local 79 v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1970), rev'd, 404
U.S. 116 (1971).
11. 404 U.S. 116 (1971).
12. Id. Section 10(k) provides in part that if "the two parties to such dispute...
have . . . agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of

. .

. the dispute . . ."

the Board will quash the § 10(k) adjudication. The issue before the Court in Plasterers'
was whether the agreement of the two disputing unions to a method of adjustment was
sufficient to deprive the Board of § 10(k) jurisdiction. The Board's position was that
the employer was a necessary party to the "method of adjustment." The court of appeals held that "parties to such dispute" referred only to the disputing unions seeking
the work, and thus the unions' agreement to a method of settlement was sufficient, in
itself, to deprive the Board of § 10(k) jurisdiction. 440 F.2d at 180-81. The Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals and accepted the Board's position that to deprive
the Board of § 10(k) jurisdiction the "method of adjustment" must be agreed upon by the
unions and the employer. 404 U.S. at 135-36. The Court relied extensively on the
real economic interest the employer had in the adjudication of work assignment disputes.
For a critical comment on the Supreme Court's decision in Plasterers' see Player, supra
note 6, at 455-57. See also Comment, The Employer as a Necessary Party to Voluntary
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of the employer's interest in the merits of a resolution, while denial
of the employer's petition for review could at one time be supported
by the idea that the employer was not "aggrieved" because he had no
legal interest in section 10(k) awards, that analysis must now be rejected.
B.

The Section 10(k) Award as a "FinalOrder"

Section 10(f), however, further requires that the employer be aggrieved by a "final order."' 3 Under the NLRA, "order" has customarily
been construed to mean only unfair labor practice orders.' 4 The Supreme Court has held that certification and the steps necessary to obtain it are not "orders" within the meaning of the Act. 5 Lower courts,
analogizing to certification, have reached the same conclusion in regard
to section 10(k) awards. 16 Although dicta from the 1971 Plasterers'
decision reflected the Court's belief that section 10(k) awards were
not final,' 7 it was not until the 1975 decision of International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. Local 134, IBEW'8 that the Court positively
stated that section 10(k) awards were not "final orders."' 9 The decision, however, cannot be viewed as dispositive of the question of an
employer's right to immediate review, since the Court did not address
that precise issue. International Telephone & Telegraph involved
the applicability of the procedural protections of section 5 of the AdSecministrative Procedure Act to section 10(k) hearings.20
tion 5 of the APA applies to every "adjudication,"'" which is defined
in the APA as the "process for the formulation of an order."2 2 "Order"
Settlement of Work Assignment Disputes Under Section 10(k) of the NLRA,

38 U.

Cn. L. REv. 389 (1971).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970).
14. See AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 409 (1940); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
15. AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 406-09 (1940).
16. Shell Chem. Co. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
95 S. Ct. 1951 (1975); cf. Henderson v. Longshoremen's Local 50, 457 F.2d 572 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 852 (1972); NLRB v. Longshoremen's Union, 378 F.2d

33 (9th Cir. 1967).
17. "mhe § 10(k) decision standing alone binds no one. No cease and desist order against either union or employer results from such a proceeding."
terers' Local 79, 404 U.S. 116, 126 (1971).
18. 419 U.S. 428 (1975).
19. Id. at 443-44.

NLRB v. Plas-

20. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970). See note 2 supra.
21. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970).
22. 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (1970).
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is in turn defined as "the whole or part of a final disposition. 23 The
Court concluded that a section 10(k) decision was not a "final disposition" and thus not an "order." Consequently, the procedures required
for an "adjudication" were not applicable to section 10(k) proceed2
ings. 4
The Court's conclusion that a section 10(k) hearing does not produce a "final order" is abstractly correct when applied to the usual
situation in which the losing labor organization seeks immediate and
direct review of the award. The losing union can continue its economic pressure and the NLRB will process a section 8(b)(4)(D) complaint against it.25 The union so charged is free to defend the complaint
on the grounds that the section 10(k) award to the other union was
erroneous. Although the Board ordinarily will not rehear the underlying section 10(k) dispute, 6 the court of appeals, on review of the
unfair labor practice order, is free to examine the propriety of the section 10(k) award. 7 Thus the union that loses the section 10(k) contest may secure indirect review of the award at a later stage by the
commission of an unfair labor practice. The Supreme Court was
therefore correct in holding that a section 10(k) award is not a "final
order," at least as between the disputing unions.
The employer, however, is not guaranteed any similar, indirect review of the award, although it is conceivable that the employer could
secure review through commission of a section 8(a) (5) unfair labor
practice.28 If a section 10(k) award were viewed as a clarification of
a prior Board certification, the employer's refusal to recognize the valid
beneficiary of the section 10(k) award might be construed as an unlawful refusal to bargain with a certified representative. 29 In deciding
on the propriety of the section 8(a)(5) complaint, triggered by the employer's refusal to assign the work according to the award, the courts
23. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1970).
24. 419 U.S. at 443.
25. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1970); note 1 supra.
26. See Stereotypers Local 22, 160 N.L.R.B. 184 (1966); cf. International Typographical Union, 125 N.L.R.B. 759 (1959).
27. See NLRB v. Longshoremen's Local 50, 504 F.2d 1209, 1218 & n.3 (9th Cir.
1974).
28. Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970), provides: "It
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employerto refuse to bargain collectively with representatives of his employees. ... "
29. See Sussman, Section 10(k): Mandate for Change?, 47 B.U.L. REv. 201, 21112 n.56 (1967).
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could focus on the underlying section 10(k) award."s

The Board,

however, believing in the "non-finality" of the section 10(k) order, has
refused to accept the basic premise of this argument." Section 10(k)
awards are not binding on the employer and therefore action by the
e2
employer cannot activate Board processes
Thus, whether a section 10(k) award will be subject to judicial
review is entirely beyond the employer's control since the only source
of review is based on a section 8(b)(4)(D) complaint, triggered by

a union's refusal to accede to the section 10(k) award. The employer
plays no role in the union's decision to challenge the section 10(k)
award by continuing to apply economic pressure. s It would seem that
as to the employer, the section 10(k) award is a "final disposition,"
and therefore an "order" subject to section 10(f) review by a court
of appeals. The employer's economic interest in which group should
perform work for him has been resolved by the Board. Nothing remains to be done. If he is to secure review, and it must be presumed

that he so desires,

4

it must be granted at this stage. s5

30. Although providing the employer with review of the § 10(k) award, this approach has the disadvantage of subjecting the employer who disagrees with the award
to Board remedies. Affirmative enforcement against the employer would sacrifice economic self-determination of purely economic disputes between a union which had been
awarded the work and the employer who, for economic reasons, desired to assign the
work to a competing group.
31. Machinists Lodge 68, 81 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1949); Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari
at 18, NLRB v. Plasterers' Local 79, 404 U.S. 116 (1971).
32. See 404 U.S. at 126. See also International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Local 134,
IBEW, 419 U.S. 428 (1975). Some early discussion by Congress concerning the appointment of an arbitrator to resolve work assignment disputes tends to support the idea
that the employer was to be bound by a § 10(k) award. The weight of the legislative
history, however, indicates that the employer per se did not have to abide by the award
under penalty of an unfair labor practice remedy. See Farmer & Powers, The Role of
the National Labor Relations Board in Resolving JurisdictionalDisputes, 46 VA. L. REv.
660, 694-95 (1960).
33. The decision of the General Counsel not to issue a complaint is an act of discretion not subject to judicial review. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); ILGWU
Local 415-475 v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 823, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
34. Cf. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINIStRATIVE

ACTION 336 (1965).

35. It is possible that direct review of the § 10(k) award could be secured via an
action filed in the federal district court, utilizing as a jurisdictional basis 28 U.S.C. §
1337 (1970) (original jurisdiction in commerce and antitrust area), or perhaps § 10(a)
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). See Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of FederalAdministrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REv.
389, 443-46 (1970). Such extraordinary review, however, would apparently be avail.
able only if the National Labor Relations Act expressly, or by implication, does not preclude that review. Absent patent illegality, the Supreme Court has indicated that the
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The Standardof Review

Until recently the problem of an employer securing review of section 10(k) awards was largely academic. First, work assignments
were almost automatically awarded in accordance with the employer's
preference. In less than one case out of twenty did the Board fail to
follow the employer's initial assignment."0 Very few employers either
needed or wished to seek review. Secondly, the scope of review of
section 10(k) awards was limited to a consideration of whether the
For example, the
Board's decision was "arbitrary and capricious."3
Fifth Circuit determined that Congress did not intend the courts "to
consider the relevant factors and to weigh and evaluate the evidence
adduced with respect to each. ' ' 38 In applying this narrow standard of
review the courts sustained the Board's section 10(k) awards in fourteen
consecutive cases from 1962 through 1973. 31 Since section 10(k)
awards received rubber-stamp approval, any objecting party had little
hope of obtaining judicial relief.
The recent Ninth Circuit decision in NLRB v. Longshoremen's
Local 5040 may represent the demise of this phenomenon and employer pressure for review of section 10(k) awards may develop.
Though still purporting to apply the "arbitrary and capricious" standard,
the Ninth Circuit ordered the Board to establish relevant criteria for
choosing between the competing unions and to apply those criteria to
the facts of each case. 4 ' The court indicated that in the future it would
examine the factors involved and the Board's action based thereon, and
would dismiss the section 8(b)(4)(D) complaint if the section 10(k)
award was "arbitrary and capricious" in its failure to apply the proper
standards. Thus it can be expected that courts will begin to examine
more closely the merits of section 10(k) awards. Review of the award
review provided within the National Labor Relations Act is exclusive. See Boire v.
Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958). It can
be assumed that § 10(k) resolutions are judgment decisions not so patently illegal as to
meet the stringent standard of Leedom. Therefore, the inquiry herein is whether review
should be granted, not extraordinarily through district court actions, but through regular
§ 10(f) court of appeals review on petitions of persons aggrieved by final Board orders.

36. Empirical studies indicate that 90-98% of § 10(k) awards are made according
to employer preference.

See Player, supra note 6, at 435 n.8.

37. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pressmen's Local 6, 385 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1967).
38. Typographical Union Local 17 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 755, 765 (5th Cir. 1966),
quoting NLRB v. Operating Engineers Local 825, 326 F.2d 213, 218 (3d Cir. 1964).

39. NLRB v. Longshoremen's Local 50, 504 F.2d 1209, 1218 n.3 (9th Cir. 1974).
40. id.
41. Id. at 1220. See note 5 supra.
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will thereby become a meaningful right, not only for unions, but also
for employers.
In addition, despite the great weight given the employer's preference by the Ninth Circuit, which in this writer's view is erroneous, it
can be anticipated that employer preference will not continue to have
the almost conclusive weight that it once commanded. Close judicial
analysis will disclose that section 10(k) awards may be arbitrary and
capricious if undue weight is given to employer preference to the exclusion of more relevant criteria, such as area custom and third-party
awards. If the Board does adopt a more balanced view toward employer preference, the number of employers seeking judicial review
should increase greatly. Although the review they might receive would
probably be more meaningful than it has been in past years, the more
central issue of their right to review is still in question, particularly in
light of InternationalTelephone & Telegraph.4 2
D.

Finality: A Suggested Analysis

Although it may appear that International Telephone & Telegraph has irreversibly closed off any avenue of appeal for employers,
the problem of review cannot be satisfactorily resolved by resorting to
the sweeping assertion of that decision that section 10(k) orders are
not "final." Rather, a more searching analysis must be made of three
questions relevant to finality. First, does the agency action substantially affect a recognized right or interest? Second, is any further
agency action possible for the evaluation of the asserted interest?
Third, does the statute itself, or any policy underlying the statute, preclude review of the agency action? If the answer to the first question
is "yes," and the answer to the last two "no," review should be granted.
Applying these standards to section 10(k) awards wherein the
union is seeking review, it is obvious that the section 10(k) award is
not final. Although the resolution does affect an interest of the union,
further agency action is possible through an unfair labor practice proceeding precipitated by the losing union. Furthermore, delay of that
unfair labor practice proceeding by court of appeals review of the
award would bifurcate the proceeding, frustrate the interrelationship
between section 10(k) and section 8(b)(4)(D), and delay final resolution of the dispute.
When applied to the objecting employer, the finality analysis produces a contrary result. In Plasterers' the Supreme Court explicitly
42. See note 2 supra.
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recognized that the employer has a cognizable economic stake in work
assignment awards.43 In addition, although the Board does not apply
stare decisis, 44 past Board awards under similar circumstances, and the
custom that such awards create, will undoubtedly influence future
Board awards arising under similar circumstances. Thus an employer,
or class of employers similarly situated, may be locked into an arbitrary
and economically disastrous work assignment pattern. Certainly this
interest warrants judicial review. Furthermore, unless the losing union
joins the employer, the employer has no further agency review of his
claim. There is no indirect method by which the employer, acting
alone, can trigger further Board or eventual court adjudication.
Finally, there is no countervailing policy sufficiently compelling to deny
review. The agency action is complete. Competing claims have finally
been resolved. There is no unfair labor practice charge pending.
The union winning the section 10(k) award is legally free to exert economic leverage to secure the assignment. 45 The employer is free to
comply with the award pending any judicial review or to resist the
award without legal liability until final review. No party is frustrated
or delayed in the assertion of his rights. Neither the statutory scheme
nor the administrative process has been undermined.
In light of this analysis, the analogy drawn by the lower courts between section 10(k) awards and employee objections to the certification process is conceptually unsound with respect to reviewability. 46
Unless an employer refuses to bargain with the certified union, questions concerning the process of certification will never be reviewed by
a court. The NLRA emphasizes the need for rapid resolution of certification questions and prompt movement toward a collective bargaining relationship.4 7 If individual objections to the certification process
were entertained by courts, collective bargaining would often be substantially delayed. Therefore, except in cases of patent illegality, the
possible incursion on individual employee rights is more than offset by
48
the need to avoid delay in the certification and bargaining process.
43. 404 U.S. at 124.
44. Machinists Lodge 1743, 135 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1962).
45. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpet Layers Local 419, 397 U.S. 655 (1970); Hen-

derson v. Longshoremen's Local 50, 457 F.2d 572 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 852
(1972).
46.

See text accompanying notes 15 & 16 supra.

47. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
48.

Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184

(1958).
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No similarly strong countervailing policy, however, justifies denial of
review to an employer following an adverse section 10(k) resolution.
III.

REVIEW OF THE ORDER QUASHING THE SECTION 10
HEARING PRIOR TO A RESOLUTION

(k)

Disagreement has arisen among the courts of appeals as to
whether a Board decision to quash a section 10(k) hearing before any
award is made and may be reviewed.4 9 Upon a charge that a union is
utilizing proscribed pressure to secure a work assignment,5 0 the Board
schedules a section 10(k) proceeding to hear and determine the dispute. 5 A number of findings uncovered in the preliminary investigation may prompt the Board to quash the section 10(k) hearing: facts
52
may disclose that the union has an object other than work assignment;
it may appear to the Board that the disputing unions have themselves
resolved the dispute; 53 or the Board may find that the "parties" to the
dispute have agreed upon a private method of resolution. 54 Although
the General Counsel takes no part in the decision to quash, he will
thereafter automatically dismiss the section 8(b)(4)(D) unfair labor
practice charge without a complaint ever being issued. The General
Counsel's decision not to issue a complaint is discretionary and is not
subject to review. 5 The decision by the Board to dismiss a complaint that has issued, however, is a "final order" subject to judicial review.5 6 Generally that distinction works well, but when literally and
technically applied to the unique area of work assignment disputes it
can deprive an employer of judicial review of actions substantially affecting his economic interests.
The decision to quash the section 10(k) hearing is actually based
49. Compare Waterway Terminals Co. v. NLRB, 467 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1972)
(reviewable), with Shell Chem. Co. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. de-

nied, 95 S. Ct. 1951 (1975) (unreviewable).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1970) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization to use proscribed pressure with the object of "forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization .... "
51. See Ironworkers Local 595, 112 N.L.R.B. 812, 814 (1955). For a more complete discussion of the procedural interplay between § 8(b)(4)(D) and § 10(k) see
Player, supra note 6, at 422-26, 450-63.
52. See, e.g., Sheetmetal Workers Local 420, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 173 (1972), in
which the union asserted that the object was "informational." In Carpenters Local
1229, 194 N.L.R.B. 640 (1972), the union argued that the picketing was to protest an
"unfair labor practice."
53. Highway Truckers Local 107, 134 N.L.R.B. 1320 (1961).
54. See, e.g., Bricklayers Local 17, 199 N.L.R.B. 182 (1972).
55. See note 24 supra.
56. Laundry Workers Local 22 v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1952).
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on findings by the Board, not decisions by the General Counsel. Yet
conventional reasoning would deprive the employer of judicial review
in these situations on the grounds that no "final order" has issued from
the Board. All that has technically transpired is an election by the
General Counsel not to issue a complaint-an action not subject to review." 7 Therefore, by applying what seems to be an overly technical
analysis, ill fitted to the unique characteristics of a section 10(k) proceeding, the employer is deprived of the opportunity to secure judicial
review of assertions that were rejected by the Board.
The Ninth Circuit, recognizing the anomaly, has ruled that the
quashing of the section 10(k) hearing is tantamount to the dismissal
of a complaint and therefore is subject to judicial review. 58 In a section
10(k) proceeding the Board, not the General Counsel, makes a detailed analysis of the jurisdictional prerequisites to a section 10(k) determination. The resolution of the jurisdictional issue results in a
Board decision to dismiss or not to dismiss the underlying unfair labor
practice charge. In reality it is not a General Counsel decision against
issuing a complaint. When the Board quashes a section 10(k) hearing
this is a decision directing that a complaint cannot be issued. The
General Counsel has no discretion to act or not to act. Furthermore
the determinations of the Board in quashing section 10(k) hearings go
far beyond the General Counsel's threshold determination of whether a complaint shall issue. The Board frequently makes sophisticated determinations with respect to motive. 59 The Board may be
forced to make legal evaluations of whether an employer has "agreed"
to a private method of settlement. 60 These findings are binding on
the General Counsel. This action by the Board is thus closely analo57. Shell Chem. Co. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1116, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
95 S. Ct. 1951 (1975).
58. Waterway Terminals Co. v. NLRB, 467 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1972). The court
held that the Board's decision to quash a § 10(k) hearing was a final order subject to
judicial review because it permitted picketing and precluded a § 8(b)(4)(D) complaint.
Id. at 1016-18. The court carefully distinguished its holding in Henderson v. Longshoremen's Local 50, 457 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 852 (1972), that
the General Counsel's refusal to issue a § 8(b) (4) (D) complaint after an actual § 10
(k) hearing was unreviewable. It reasoned that denial of the "review of a refusal to
proceed to award under a Section 10(k) proceeding [would] nullify the effectiveness of
Section 8(b)(4)(D)." 467 F.2d at 1016. Presumably, denial of review of agency action after a full hearing would not have such a dire effect.
59. See Painters Council 9, 183 N.L.R.B. 78, 80 (1970); Player, supra note 6, at
450-52.

60. See Operating Engineers Local 701, 182 N.L.R.B. 77, 79 (1970); Laborers Local 42, 182 N.L.R.B. 862, 864 (1970); Laborers Local 663, 181 N.L.R.B. 380, 381-82
(1970).
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gous to decisions under other sections of the Act that complaints
should be dismissed. It is far removed from the discretionary decision
of the General Counsel not to issue a complaint. In the opinion of
the Ninth Circuit, this unique Board action is a "final order" subject
to judicial review. This decision, in recognizing the unique realities
of a section 10(k) proceeding, employs a sophisticated analysis that
should be followed by the other courts of appeals.
The Ninth Circuit could have arrived at the same result by way
of a finality analysis. The decision of the Board to quash a section
10(k) hearing does affect employer interests by determining whether
he must suffer economic pressure from a union. The decision may determine whether or not he has agreed to be bound by private dispute
resolution machinery, waiving his statutory right to a Board resolution
of the work assignment dispute. The decision of the private machinery
will, in turn, determine the rightful claimant to the disputed work as
surely as will a section 10(k) resolution. 6 There is no further method
by which the employer may receive additional administrative review.
There is no technique to secure indirect judicial review. The action
by the Board in quashing the section 10(k) hearing and dismissing the
charge will generally remove the Board from further consideration of
the matter.6 2 At this point, there appears to be no reason why review
should not be granted, since the administrative process is neither delayed nor frustrated. No fundamental policy of the Act, such as encouragement of prompt collective bargaining, would be frustrated by
such review. This is clearly distinguishable from the discretionary
power of the General Counsel not to issue complaints even though
rights are also adjudicated in that action. The dual policies of protecting administrative discretion in the enforcement of the statute and
conservation of enforcement resources favor denial of review of such
decisions.
IV.

CONCLUSION

At one time, a persuasive argument could be made that the em61. The union which wins the award in the private tribunal may assert economic
pressure against the employer to secure the work assignment. The General Counsel, or
regional director acting in that capacity, in spite of a literal violation of § 8(b) (4) (D),
will not entertain an unfair labor practice charge. 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.33 & 102.93
(1975). See Player, supra note 6, at 431-32.
62. Should the union losing the private award seek to use pressure against the employer to secure the assignment notwithstanding the award, the Board will issue a
§ 8(b)(4)(D) complaint. Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 1345
(1958). See also NLRB v. Plasterers' Local 79, 404 U.S. 116, 127 (1971).
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ployer's rights in a section 10(k) adjudication did not relate to the
merits of the resolution, only to the fact of resolution itself. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recognized the economic importance of
section 10(k) proceedings to employers. It seems, therefore, that the
employer should enjoy judicial review of agency action that has an adverse impact on these economic interests. The normal unfair labor
practice route cannot guarantee such review. There is no sound policy
reason for denial of review and section 10(f) should be interpreted
to grant this right to review. Simply stating that a section 10(k) adjudication is not "final" is not the answer but merely begs the question.
The Ninth Circuit at one time followed the dogma that section
10(k) decisions are not final.6 3 In Waterway Terminals Co. v.
NLRB, 6 4 however, that court held that the quashing of a section
10(k) hearing is a "final order." The court attempted to distinguish
this from a section 10(k) resolution. As far as an employer is concerned, however, the situations are practically identical. A section
10(k) adjudication accepted by the unions results in a dismissal of the
section 8(b) (4) (D) charge and finally establishes the employer's
rights. The decision to quash the section 10(k) hearing results in a
similar dismissal of the charge and equally fixes the employer's rights.
No further administrative avenues are open. In neither situation do
there appear to be compelling reasons to deny the employer review
of the action that has fixed his interests. The employer in both situations should be entitled to court of appeals review via section 10(f).
63. Henderson v. Longshoremen's Local 50, 457 F.2d 572 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 852 (1972).
64.

467 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1972).
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